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Abstract
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the unclassified version of the
U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) both focus on China and Russia as preeminent
challenges for the United States. The NDS states specifically, “Long-term strategic
competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department [of
Defense].”1 This paper focuses on the strategic challenges that these two nations pose and
provides recommendations for U.S. strategy and policy. Globalization and the rapid
advancement of technology has changed the utility of force in the 21st century. The utility
of force has evolved, resulting in a shift in the character of war. This shift entails an
increased focus on methods of force mainly below the threshold of traditional armed
great power conflict. In order to preserve a stable international order, the U.S. needs
strategies and polices that adapt to the new threat environment. In particular the United
States should: (1) Concurrently build defensive capabilities and adopt a strong and public
policy of deterrence to counter current and emerging hybrid, gray-zone, and advanced
technological threats. (2) Renew dedication to longer-term interests and favor negotiated
solutions—including pursuing norms and agreements on emerging conflict-relevant
technologies—to counter the growing risk of miscalculation and escalation from grayzone provocations (most notably in the cyber domain). (3) Increase domestic resilience
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by strengthening the electoral system, building stronger public-private partnerships, and
working with the international community to increase attribution in the cyber domain. (4)
Ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and provide additional
funding for initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. (5) Strongly defend the status quo with Taiwan
and in the South China Sea but, after increasing U.S. strategic involvement in the region,
lead and pursue negotiations on more permanent solutions.
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Introduction
U.S. national interests and priorities can and will evolve, especially with changing
administrations. In the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Trump Administration
laid out the nation’s four vital national interests, called the “four pillars”: Protect the
homeland, the American people, and the American way of life; promote American
prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance American influence.2 Since the
Cold War, the United States has also traditionally viewed a strong North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), strong U.S. led liberal institutions worldwide, and flourishing
democratic governance as being vital to the interests of the United States. All of these
interests must be considered when building a strategy.
Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal
priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained
investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and
prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.3 –
Unclassified Summary of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy
The 21st century, has been marked by an evolving and increasingly complex threat
environment. According to the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, “[t]he risk of interstate conflict, including among great powers,
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is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War.”4 Although the risk of conflict is
increasing, the environment in which conflict occurs is heavily impacted by nuclear
weapons, escalation management, and a rapidly evolving technological environment.
These factors have led nations to significantly limit and change their use of force; while
there is no shortage of conflict globally, the forms that conflict has taken have shifted to
more non-traditional means. Globalization and the rapid advancement of technology has
changed great power politics and the utility of force. This change demands new strategies
and policies, if the U.S. led international order is to thrive. To describe empirically how
the utility of force has changed, this thesis examines some recent conflicts, threats, and
interactions involving Russia, China, and the United States. Key topics include hybrid
warfare, election interference, certain cyber events, and the tense situation in the South
China Sea. Following the analyses, policy recommendations for the United States are
made.
Russian and Chinese actions have catalyzed the evolution of geopolitics in
Eurasia and increasingly threatened U.S. interests in the region. Russia is a major threat
to the United States and is developing new weapons and technologies to threaten U.S.
assets both internationally and in outer space. Furthermore, Russia’s use of hybrid
warfare and election interference raises major domestic concerns and challenges. Russia
currently poses the greatest military threat to the United States but has less potential for
growth and long-term strategic disruption when compared to China. Thus, a more
4
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traditional policy of strong deterrence and strategic messaging is recommended—
especially with regard to cyber threats and interference in essential democratic processes.
One of the greatest challenges for the United States in the 21st Century will be
adapting to and shaping the evolving international order in a way that satisfies and favors
U.S. equities, while also addressing the core interests of the Communist Party of China—
to encourage further assimilation into the current order. China has more recently become
a major threat to the interests of the United States and has grown and expanded its
influence not only in the Eurasian region, but globally. It has high potential for continued
growth and expansion both economically and militarily. China has invested a large
portion of its wealth in new technology and military capabilities and has continued to
steal cutting-edge military advances and technology from other countries—particularly
the United States. China’s domestic aircraft carrier program is eventually expected to
launch multiple modern aircraft carriers, including one that is similar in size and
capability to the newest U.S. carrier class—the Gerald R. Ford. This will impact the
balance of power and geopolitics of the region and will continue to afford China more
military leverage. In addition to the use of cyber capacities against the United States,
China has also been developing and testing various outer space and anti-satellite
capabilities that threaten U.S. assets.
Growth in Chinese influence and power is inevitable, and U.S. strategy and policy
must take this into greater account. The U.S. response to China should be different than
the response to Russia. If strong Chinese growth continues, sooner or later their concerns
in Eurasia—as well as their concerns regarding the current international order as a
whole—will have to be adequately addressed. The United States must create a dialogue
3

with China toward determining what it would take for China to become a willing and
more productive member of the current international order—instead of a revisionist
power trying to supplant it. If this is to be accomplished, major powers benefiting from
the current order must be willing to make significant concessions of value. Additionally,
if concessions are to be made, it is in the best interest of the status quo powers to make
them sooner rather than later. As China continues to grow, it will gain more leverage and
will demand greater concessions—making reaching an agreement more difficult. Thus, it
is in the best interest of the United States to prioritize cooperation with Beijing now,
while also managing Chinese growth and ensuring that China becomes a constructive
member of the current international order.
That goal includes promoting the rule of international law and the U.S. should
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Finally, the
U.S. must remain a strong and continuing presence in the Indo-Pacific. It is in the United
States’ best interest to provide more funding for political, military, and economic
initiatives in the region and to assure allies and partners in the region of its continued
commitment. These actions will help ensure that the U.S. will be negotiating from a
position of strength and will be able to resolutely respond if China commits fully to
fighting against the rule of law and current international order.

4

The Utility of Force in the 21st Century
The utility of force, in the sense of direct physical fighting, has been reduced in
the 21st century, making war between major powers’ militaries highly unlikely. Defense
and deterrence are still essential and necessary, but the importance has shifted from
physical territorial control over an adversary to political control and influence by other
means. New capabilities and advancements in technology have changed the context and
shifted the traditional utility of force—changing the character of war. The U.S.
Department of Defense has even recognized this in the most recent unclassified version
of the National Defense Strategy stating that the “security environment is also affected by
rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war.”5
The invention of nuclear weapons and their proliferation has drastically increased
the escalatory risks of waging political violence against others—especially against a
nuclear power. Additionally, even if a nation is not a nuclear power, large scale political
violence against another nation has still become riskier. The constant threat of an external
power deciding that it wants to impact the outcome of a conflict increases the likelihood
of unexpected escalation that could fundamentally change the conflict. If a great power
decides that it is in its best interest for one side to win a conflict—or simply that it did not
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want one or any of the sides to emerge victorious—they have multiple ways to change
the dynamic of the conflict, through direct force, covert action, cyberattacks, military
assistance, economic sanctions, and/or political pressure. The addition of cyberwarfare
and new technologies in recent years have continually added more means below large
scale armed conflict and it is likely that this trend will continue. As more of these
capabilities are employed successfully, research and development will remain a priority.
Investing in militaries and building the capabilities to use force is still necessary
to ensure that the escalatory ladder creates ample risk to continue to be a strong deterrent.
For example, a nuclear power need not explicitly threaten the use of nuclear weapons to
achieve a deterrent effect. Simply having the capability to mutually assure destruction
(MAD) is enough to fundamentally increase the escalatory risk of engaging in any type of
conflict. This is why escalation management is so critical in the 21st century. There will
always be an us vs. them mentality somewhere in the world. Therefore, there will always
be an actual or potential adversary. How nations and groups plan and strategize for
interactions with their adversaries has evolved to require extreme caution with regard to
escalation. Whether considering a nuclear attack, armed conflict, use of cyber
capabilities, espionage, space weaponization, predatory economics or even election
influence, extreme caution and due regard to escalation risk must always be taken to
formulate an effective strategy in the 21st century. While limited war and MAD are not
new topics, the rapid growth and development of new technologies has led to additional
challenges that are less black and white. Cyberweapons, artificial intelligence,
militarization of space, and various other technological advancements in warfare have

6

made escalation management more complex, but no less important. Without a proper
escalation management strategy, plans will not survive first contact with a major power.
In terms of complexity, recent technological advances challenge traditional
thinking of the use and utility of force. For example, a cyberweapon that causes physical
damage to a nation’s critical infrastructure that impacts national security, or even a
population’s safety, must still be deemed as a use of force. However, cyber-attacks on
servers to steal information may seem more similar to traditional espionage than to force
for some—even if this attack causes some property, software, or monetary damage. The
difficulty is distinguishing between types of attacks within this domain that all may be
classified differently by different people, nations, or institutions—especially when there
is an infinite number of possible variations. Thus, even if all nations wanted cyber arms
control, creating effective agreements or laws limiting this domain would likely prove
incredibly difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, nations are left to make difficult and
complex judgements regarding both offense and defense in this domain with due regard
to escalation management—especially, when the adversarial nation or actor has
developed either actual nuclear capability or a nuclear-like technological capability.
Additionally, it requires cyber actors (both state and non-state) to consider hybrid
ramifications of even small attacks, counterattacks, and escalations both within and
outside of the cyber domain. Each actor making these rapid and complex decisions in this
domain leaves significant room for dangerous miscalculation—especially in a domain
where attribution can prove difficult.
There are strong incentives to limit the use of force, however there is still
circumstantial utility. The use of small and specialized forces to conduct covert action in
7

support of groups and nations with similar interests still plays a significant role. This can
achieve national policy objectives with minimal escalatory risk and, in some cases, can
even be done while hiding the hand of the actors involved. Some examples include covert
action, counterterrorism operations, intra-state conflict, and proxy wars. Actors have been
able to effectively utilize an amount of force that is limited enough to not provoke a
major escalation, but still achieves their main political objectives.
Given the limited utility of force, states are incentivized to find utility elsewhere
to gain greater power, influence, and control over outcomes. The utility of economics in
the 21st century has been a major focus for many actors—but has been especially evident
for China. The Chinese government has made it clear that they intend to change the status
quo and create a region and world in which China holds a stronger and more influential
position in the global order. With the understanding of today’s limited utility of force,
China has been playing a long-term economic strategy to achieve great power status and
increase its global influence.6 It has been capitalizing on a large workforce, dedicating
significant resources to foreign investments, and using its rapidly growing economy to
become a major influencer in the region. “China’s double-digit economic growth has
slowed recently, but it served to fund several successive defense modernization FiveYear Plans”.7
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Additionally, China has realized it is much cheaper and faster to steal cutting edge
technologies from other countries than to dedicate vast amounts of resources on
developing them from scratch. It is clear that the Peoples Liberation Army and its
Naval branch (PLAN) are growing and modernizing at a rapid pace—especially with
regard to its aircraft carrier program.8 Having a modern navy with similar capabilities to
the United States automatically provides status, influence, and deterrence—even without
any explicit threat—which can shift the geopolitical situation without the actual use of
force.
The ability to modernize and grow the military this rapidly is a product of actions
taken below the threshold of armed conflict. The strategy has included economic
priorities, cyber operations, and effective intelligence operations. According to the 2017
National Security Strategy of the United States,
Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at
hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage
ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societies.9
This has become a significant way for adversaries to achieve political goals without using
force and without major risk.
Russia, in some instances, has taken an approach that involves greater risk of
escalation than other actors, but this is a product of Russia’s less fortunate geopolitical
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and economic situation. The Russian economy is extremely dependent on natural
resource production (mainly oil and gas) and does not have the Chinese luxury of playing
a long-term strategy that is primarily focused on economics. The Russian mindset, and
subsequently its strategy, is based heavily on a historical pattern of defeats and a desire to
gain back some of its previous Soviet glory. This mindset combined with President
Putin’s previous career as a KGB officer places a premium on military strength; however,
Putin still understands the limited utility of force and utilizes restraint.
As seen in Ukraine, military deception and focused information operations were
utilized to sow confusion and make reaction and further escalation extremely difficult and
delayed. This was what created the time and space for the main objectives to be achieved
rapidly, while also deterring a major escalatory response by the West. Putin also
understood that he needed to limit his campaign to Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A full
military incursion that was meant to completely take over the Ukrainian state would have
required significantly more force, resources, and time. The elements of surprise and
confusion that were created by the advanced information operations and relatively limited
use of force would have eventually been lost—and the possibility of major escalation by
the U.S. and other states would have increased substantially. While taking over
Sevastopol was an important military objective, making a move on Ukraine was
motivative by geopolitical strategy.
NATO-Russia relations in Eurasia can be described as geopolitical chess. Russian
military strength and advanced technological capabilities are important for attempting to
deter NATO enlargement near its borders. On March 27, 2020, North Macedonia became
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the 30th member of the Alliance.10 Although North Macedonia is not geographically close
to Russia, it is evidence that NATO is still enlarging and “[a]t the 2008 Bucharest
Summit, the Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO in
the future.”11 Russia is appropriately concerned that NATO enlargement will decrease
Russia’s relative power and influence both in the economic and political realms.
Additionally, NATO enlargement in Eurasia decreases and, in some cases, eliminates
buffer zones that Russia views as important. Even if assuming complete Russian
confidence that NATO poses no offensive military threat, it still has reasons to oppose
NATO enlargement. As more neighboring states become members of NATO and receive
security guarantees, the amount of actions or moves Russia can take without invoking
Article 5 or running into significant political opposition become more limited.
Conversely, NATO and the U.S. gain more freedom of action as NATO expands,
especially when expansion is linked to a widening zone of Western economic and
political integration and growth. That linkage between military expansion and economic
and political power helps to explain why Russia tries to expand where it can and weaken
the U.S. and NATO whenever there is an opportunity. For example, in addition to its
actions in Ukraine and Syria, Russia has been expanding into the Arctic militarily.12 The
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northern approach is not only the closest and most likely route that either the U.S. or
Russia would take for an attack, but also is home to vast natural resources including oil
and natural gas.
Russian economic expansion and growth is limited relative to other great powers.
Therefore, the development and use of various means just below the threshold of armed
great-power conflict have been a top priority for the Russians. Due to Russia’s
geopolitical and economic situation, the Russian policy accepts more risk and they are
more willing to test out gray-zone/hybrid capabilities. However, the Russian’s still take
great caution to stay below the threshold of provoking a major escalatory response from
their adversaries. General O’Shaugnessy, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has
spoken publicly to Congress about this threat from Russia and other adversaries:
[K]ey adversaries have demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate they
currently have the capability, capacity, and intent to hold our homeland at
significant risk below the threshold of nuclear war. Eroding military advantage is
undermining our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter
aggression against the homeland. This is emboldening competitors and
adversaries to challenge us at home, holding at risk our people, our critical
infrastructure, and our ability to project power forward.13
Although Russia has been more aggressive and has risked greater escalation, the
strategy has largely been effective—as the U.S. has not significantly escalated. Russia is
clearly testing the boundaries to try to determine exactly how limited the use of force is in
the 21st century. It is clear that the U.S. is capable of escalating but has so far been
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unwilling. For the current administration, the risks and costs up to this point have
apparently outweighed the benefits of significant escalation by the U.S. If the United
States was willing to escalate through retaliation and effectively communicated this
willingness, then the Russian’s would likely recalculate and further bound and limit their
operations. However, the Russians are currently willing to wade into unexplored waters
and find out just how far they can go without significant consequence—in other words,
figuring out what actions do and don’t cause significant escalation. The Russians are
trying to determine exactly where that threshold (or line) actually is in the current
geopolitical context. However, this is not only a probing/scouting maneuver, but also is a
mission that has “battle” tested capabilities and achieved significant effects on its
targets—as evidenced by the 2017 U.S. intelligence community assessment on Russian
election interference.14
There is currently a limited utility of force and it is very likely to continue into the
near future; however, if there is fundamental change in the current conditions, the utility
of force could exponentially increase. Some events or circumstances that could
potentially cause a resurgence in the utility of force are listed and described below:
Pivotal Discoveries
or Inventions:
(either on Earth or
in outer space)

14

Fundamental
Change in Great
Power
Relationships:
(possibly an even
closer Russia/China
relationship)

Extreme
Impacts
Stemming
from a
Significant
Change in
Climate

Development of an
Extreme Cyber
Capabilities/Artificial
intelligence Gap:
(where one nation or
group holds a vast and
consequential
comparative advantage
over all others)

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
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If any of these or other major shifts—like regime change—occur, then global geopolitics
could change fundamentally. These examples and others would result in significant
change in actors’ cost-benefit analyses. If a country is suffering from major famine, for
example, the survivability of the state could be threatened. In this instance, the Hobbesian
state of nature could kick in and make states and people act in ways they would not have
otherwise. The risk of escalation and the cost of using more force may actually become
worth the potential benefits of achieving certain political or physical gains through force.
Caution would still be necessary—because ultimately getting nuked would not increase
survival chances—but pushing the boundaries without breaching the nuclear threshold
may certainly be more favorable when a state or its people are fighting for survival.
In the current state of international relations and security, there is a limited utility
of force; however, the degree to which force continues to be limited in the future is still in
question. This will be determined by many factors, but escalation management will
continue to play an important role regardless. As we have seen with globalization and the
invention of the internet, new technologies have the potential to rapidly transform the
economic and security environments. Therefore, in order to improve the likelihood of
long-term success, competing great powers must have a strategy to remain vigilant in
retaining various capabilities in many different areas in order to have the ability to
continuously adapt to challenges in the 21st century and beyond. In today’s rapidly
evolving global environment, adaptability is absolutely critical to the long-term success
of any international order. A static system that continually fights change at every turn is a

14

system that is destined for failure, but a system that adapts and effectively manages
change will thrive.
States wishing to either remain great or continue gaining influence must have the
ability to pivot when necessary to meet the demands of a changing world. A very capable
diplomatic arm combined with a strong military and thriving economy will better position
a state to be able to adapt quickly to threats while also attracting partners. Economic
strength not only provides the resources necessary to effectively respond to threats, but
also the resources to retain capabilities and develop new ones. A strong economy also
contributes to increased morale of citizens: as Napoleon Bonaparte said, morale is to the
physical as three to one.
Globalization and the rapid advancement of technological capabilities have
increased the complexity of deterrence, defense, warfighting, and escalation
management. Major advancements in cyberwarfare, space, artificial intelligence, and
nuclear delivery systems—like hypersonic glide vehicles—have expanded the traditional
nuclear concept of mutually assured destruction and the retaliatory risks of using force.
Achieving greater power and influence today, due to the increase in escalatory risk and
cost, has mainly (but not entirely) shifted the means of conflict to those which are
typically below the threshold of armed conflict. The current state of the world contains
the necessary conditions for these limitations of the utility of force. However, as new
technologies emerge, the utility of force will also continue to evolve. The United States
must be properly prepared and positioned to adapt to the future environment. As stated
clearly in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Russia and China must be the primary
strategic priorities for the United States—due to their current and future threat to U.S.
15

security and prosperity.15 The next section addresses U.S. relations and policy regarding
Russia and is followed by a section on China.
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U.S.-Russian Relations and Hybrid Warfare
“The risk of interstate conflict, including among great powers, is higher than at any time
since the end of the Cold War.”16
—2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community
In modern warfare, new technologies and strategies have created an evolution of the
manner in which conflict occurs. The terms hybrid warfare, new generation warfare, and
others have been used to describe warfare which has more than one facet. These facets
include conventional, unconventional, cyber, and influence campaigns—such as
disinformation spread on social media and targeted election interference. Since Russia is
a major power, and historically has been an adversary of the United States, understanding
Russian actions and methods of conflict is essential for the Homeland Defense of the
United States.
Russia has used hybrid tactics within the U.S. and in conflicts abroad. Russia has
utilized many different aspects of hybrid warfare, especially in the military realm.
Regarding modern-day hybrid tactics abroad, the following section uses the Ukrainian
conflict as a case study. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States
describes some Russian views and threats:
Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and
partners. Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
16
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Union (EU) as threats. Russia is investing in new military capabilities, including
nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United
States, and in destabilizing cyber capabilities. Through modernized forms of
subversive tactics, Russia interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries
around the world. The combination of Russian ambition and growing military
capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to
Russian miscalculation is growing.17
The constant threats from Russia are still evolving and the U.S. response must be
adaptive, vigilant, and proactive. This section evaluates the hybrid threat from Russia and
makes policy recommendations for threat mitigation.
It is essential to define the scope of the threat Russia poses to its adversaries and
enemies. Christopher Chivvis from the Rand Corporation, testifying before the House of
Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services described the scope of Russian hybrid
warfare:
As used today in reference to Russia, “hybrid warfare” refers to Moscow’s use of
a broad range of subversive instruments, many of which are nonmilitary, to
further Russian national interests. Moscow seeks to use hybrid warfare to ensure
compliance on a number of specific policy questions; to divide and weaken
NATO; to subvert pro-Western governments; to create pretexts for war; to annex
territory; and to ensure access to European markets on its own terms.18
It is important to note that this warfare not only includes tactics taken on the ground in
physical military combat, but also has a very large nonmilitary component. The
following section focuses on the components of cyber, information operations,
psychological operations, and election interference.
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Russia’s War on U.S. Democracy
The great power and liberal democratic ideology of the U.S. will always create
adversaries like Russia. Timothy Snyder, in his book The Road to Unfreedom, uses the
term “strategic relativism” to describes the Russian foreign policy goal of making others
weaker in order to benefit the Russian position geopolitically. If one of the strongest
actors in the world and in Europe/Eurasia (the U.S.) is weakened, then Russia will gain
relative strength. Snyder also argues that Russia is very limited in the amount of absolute
strength that it can attain, which is why the relative gains are so imperative.19
This argument helps to explain one significant reason why Russia has taken to
Hybrid Warfare tactics—and more specifically, cyber and information warfare aimed at
the very foundation of the U.S. government. President Donald Trump has rejected the
notion that President Putin targeted and attempted to influence the 2016 election;
however, the intelligence community (including CIA, FBI, NSA, and ODNI) released an
unclassified assessment of Russian influence and direction.
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in
2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm
her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.20
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These parts of the Intelligence Community (IC) further assess that the campaign, directed
by Putin, was hybrid in nature. This campaign utilized covert cyber intelligence
operations as well as “overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media,
third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’.” The IC has also stated
that Russia has had a long-time desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic
order.21
Undermining U.S. democracy in a globalized cyberage environment has become
much less difficult. The proliferation of online social media has become a perfect
medium for influencing operations and information warfare. The ease of penetration by
adversaries to effectively disseminate any desired information to a large portion of the
population is troubling. Specifically, the use of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google
were used as platforms to expose American voters to Russian propaganda. The Internet
Research Agency (IRA), a Russian cyberwar center, attempted to manipulate opinions of
Europeans and Americans about the Ukrainian conflict as well as the 2016 presidential
election. The IRA had about 470 Facebook sites claiming to be American political
organizations and six of them had 340 million shares of content each. Types of
manipulation included Anti-Muslim ads, to people in Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as
falsely declaring that one could vote by text message.22 The FBI has a role to play in this
arena; it has already removed many Facebook accounts, because of “coordinated
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inauthentic behavior”.23 The FBI needs to continue this work to find and intervene when
IRA and other Russian government associated accounts are found. The private sector also
has an important role to play in combating this threat—the government and private sector
working together to address this threat is essential and is considered in greater detail in
my recommendations.
Leading up to the election, the FBI discovered Russian cyber-infiltration of the
Democratic National Committee (DNC). Additionally, it became clear that Russia was
able to get into White House and Department of State systems, gaining access to
classified emails. During these attacks, Moscow was not terribly concerned with the U.S.
knowing it was behind the attacks and even fought to stay in the systems even after being
discovered. 24 After stealing information, Russia has utilized various tools to launder and
disseminate it publicly, including to WikiLeaks.
As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, “Rival actors use propaganda
and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and
spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our
partners.”25 During the Ukrainian conflict and the 2016 election, we have seen more
direct actions, an increase in the level of activity, and a widening scope of effort
compared to previous operations. It was even determined that “Russian intelligence
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obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral
boards”.26 In this case, DHS assessed the systems compromised were not involved in
vote tallying.27 It is important to note the potential impact to the legitimacy and
confidence in the electoral process. This was an attack on democracy; even without direct
access to vote tallying or the ability to directly alter votes, it threatens American
confidence in the system which is essential for peaceful transfer of power—which is a
clear threat to U.S. national security.

The Conflict in Ukraine
In the years leading up to the conflict with Russia, Ukraine flirted with two
mutually exclusive options: joining either the European Union or the Eurasian Union (its
Russian-led counterpart in the East). Both of these regional systems of integration would
benefit from Ukraine joining them in both political and economic terms. Unfortunately
for Russia, despite attempts to entice Ukraine with cheap financing and energy discounts,
Ukraine seemed to keep favoring the West. Most, but not all, Ukrainian citizens have a
strong desire to align with the West—as evidenced by the Ukrainian Revolution in
February 2014. This Revolution resulted in the removal of Ukrainian President
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Yanukovych for, amongst other actions, his last-minute signing of a treaty and loan
agreement with Russia—instead of the association agreement with the European Union.28
Putin’s attempts at politically achieving his goal of keeping Ukraine in the Eastern
sphere of influence failed and Ukraine’s trajectory turned Westward. After accepting that
fact, his next move was to mitigate the negative impact it would have on Russia and
demonstrate the consequences to Ukraine and other western sliding countries. In 2014,
Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and subsequently began sending its troops across
the border into Ukraine. This use of force was reliant on confusion and information
operations. “Little green men” who were dressed in Russian uniforms without insignias
and armed with modern Russian weaponry were utilized. Russia officially made remarks
stating that they were Crimean self-defense forces and not Russian troops. In response to
people claiming that these little green men were actually Russian troops without
insignias, President Putin responded by stating: “Take a look at the post-Soviet states.
There are many uniforms there that are similar. You can go to a store and buy any kind of
uniform.”29 This effectively caused confusion, but U.S. officials concluded that Russian
troops had crossed into Ukraine.30 This made a common understanding of what was
actually happening very difficult and domestic and international responses were
effectively delayed by the Russian tactics. The strategy successfully, at least initially,
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blurred lines and caused a questioning of who the actors were and what exactly was
going on—and ultimately concluded with a successful annexation of Crimea by the
Russians.
Ukraine’s strategic importance is not limited to the economic and political
realms. As stated by Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee, the proposed expansion of
NATO to include Ukraine in the late 2000s seriously angered Putin, who believe that
“Ukrainian membership would be … catastrophic for Russia because of the historical ties
between the two Slavic states, the large Russian population in eastern Ukraine, and the
location of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in the Crimea.”31 Crimea’s geographic
location makes it an extremely important strategic asset for Russia. The port city of
Sevastopol is especially important for its Navy, because it is where Russia’s all-important
Black Sea Fleet is based. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine had been leasing the
base to Russia. This base has been critical for Russian power projection in the region.
The fleet enabled blockading during the war with Georgia and provides naval access to
the Middle East. More recently, the Syrian civil war and Putin’s support of the Assad
regime made the port even more critical. Sevastopol can be, and allegedly has been, a
critical supply route from Russia to Syria.32 Currently, Crimea is claimed by both Russia
and Ukraine. Additionally, despite the Minsk II agreement to a ceasefire, the conflict in
eastern Ukraine continues. Meanwhile, The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
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Europe has set up a Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to “observe and report in an
impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine; and to facilitate dialogue among
all parties to the crisis.”33

Proxy Sanctuary
General Philip M. Breedlove, who was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
of NATO Allied Command Operations from May 2013 until May 2016, has stated:
Competitors have operationalized hybrid strategies and brought together multiple
lines of effort to achieve goals that can threaten our security. … Russian military
actions in the Ukraine crisis reflect a sophisticated, complex, multi-variant
approach to the use of force to achieve decisive political objectives. Russian
strategists and planners have taken the classic elements of Soviet and Russian
military thinking, combined them with 21st century tools, tactics, and capabilities,
and created new models for military action that are adapted to Russia’s strategic
situation.34
Modern Russian campaigns, including inside Ukraine, have included the use of proxy
forces to achieve Russian goals—also called “Proxy Sanctuary”.35 Additionally, of great
importance in cyberage campaigns has been the targeting and exploitation of the
adversary’s population through advanced information and influence operations. Russia
has been able to accomplish significant effects and impacts on its adversaries through the
dedication of resources and effort to leverage the modern information environment. This
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has been a target on the people/societal part of Clausewitz’s trinity. The election
interference has also started to trickle over into threatening governance structures through
direct attacks compromising security which could impact the confidence in the electoral
system.
NORAD/USNORTHCOM commander General O’Shaugnessy has described
Russia’s actions as “exploiting gaps between the traditional understanding of ‘peace’ and
‘war’”, with the goal of advancing Moscow’s interests by aggressively encroaching on
the sovereignty of its neighbors including in Ukraine. He also recognizes the difficulty in
figuring out how to respond in ways that help to solve the problems and deter this type of
behavior in the future.36
In the 2018 National Cyber Strategy, signed by President Trump, it is made clear that
“America’s prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and
challenges in cyberspace”.37 It is clear that the IC is committed to the recognition and
defense of the nation’s cyber security regardless of where the threats originate. The IC
publicly claims with high confidence that “Russia, Iran, and North Korea have conducted
reckless cyber-attacks that harmed American and international businesses”.38
As an attempt to deter Russian interference in the 2020 election, U.S. Cyber
Command publicly threatened to release personal information of “senior members of
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Russia’s government as well as Russian oligarchs, stopping short of targeting Vladimir
Putin himself”, if Russian interference operations were attempted.39 This type of warning
and threat could help to deter these type of actions. Stopping short of threatening the
release of President Putin’s information could also help to contain some further Russian
escalation—and holding information on Putin in reserve as leverage that the U.S. could
use at a different time could prove valuable. In addition, economic sanctions, political
pressure, and cyber counterattacks should continue to be considered and utilized as
necessary in reaction to actions taken by Russia against the United States. These
measures need to be supported by both the executive and legislative branches in order to
achieve meaningful effects. The use and coordination of multiple levels and departments
within one government towards the same goal is referred to as a whole-of-government
approach. It is essential to use this approach in order for the government to be more
efficient, effective, and decrease redundancies. In many cases, this approach can be more
likely to accomplish the policy objectives.
Defending against threats in the cyber domain require a coordinated and unified
effort, which is why it is vital that the entire executive branch commit to public
recognition of Russian attacks and the defense of the nation against this threat. It is
critical for national security to protect the democratic system and retain the confidence in
electoral processes. As such, one way to protect the process and retain citizen confidence
is a paper/mail-in ballot system similar to that utilized by Colorado be implemented
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nationwide. This would severely cripple the attempts of malevolent actors to be able to
interfere with the accuracy and legitimacy of an American’s vote. Implementing this
recommendation faces formidable political obstacles, but if achieved would provide
much greater security and confidence. The For the People Act of 2019 has a subsection
named the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019. It was passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives on March 8th, 2019 but has not made it through the
U.S. Senate. Section 1502 of the Act addresses the paper ballot issue:
The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified
paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made available for
inspection and verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and
counted, and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character
recognition device or other counting device.40
Passage of the Act would represent a major step toward securing U.S. elections against
what are likely to be more sophisticated attacks than occurred in 2016.
In addition, in order to help defend against foreign influencing operations and
strengthen national and homeland security, the United States should implement what I
would propose to call the Responsible Patriot Liaison (RPL) program. This program
would work similarly to the model used in Terrorism/Threat Liaison Programs, such as
seen between the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) and its public and
private sector partners—which are called Threat Liaison Officers. The RPL program
would forge these partnerships to defend against this and other threats. There will
continue to be a fierce debate on privacy vs. national security; however, foreign influence
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campaigns have targeted democracy and attempted to erode the foundations on which it
stands. It is essential for private companies to take more responsibility in protecting the
U.S. and its citizens from the type of Russian operations seen during U.S. elections.
Responsible Patriot Liaisons (RPLs) would be employees from companies that have been
utilized for these types of attacks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google. The
RPL volunteer would be cleared for information related to these threats and, when
necessary, will be given assistance by the government to combat these threats.
Additionally, the RPL would be the contact for the government if assistance from the
company is necessary.
Google, Twitter, and Facebook have voluntarily agreed to help with tackling
disinformation on their platforms in the European Union and the European Commission
produced a report in June 2019 regarding the relationship:
Disinformation is a rapidly changing threat. The tactics used by internal and
external actors, in particular linked to Russian sources, are evolving as quickly as
the measures adopted by states and online platforms … Online platforms have a
particular responsibility in tackling disinformation. Today the Commission also
publishes the latest monthly reports by Google, Twitter and Facebook under the
self-regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation. The May reports confirm the
trend of previous Commission assessments. Since January, all platforms have
made progress with regard to the transparency of political advertising and public
disclosure of such ads in libraries that provide useful tools for the analysis of ad
spending by political actors across the EU. Facebook has taken steps to ensure the
transparency of issue-based advertising, while Google and Twitter need to catch
up in this regard.41
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A similar type of voluntary agreement could also prove useful between the United States
and various private sector companies with the designated RPL being the contact for
related issues.
To counter the effectiveness and impact of Russian information and psychological
operations on the U.S. military, the United States should implement an awareness
training program for deploying units. This program would expose these units to specific
types of adversarial tactics and reduce psychological impact in the field. Using electronic
warfare assets to try to block these operations would also be advised. The employment of
cyber defenders or self-defense hacking units will deter and decrease the effectiveness of
such operations against U.S. and allied forces.
It is clear that operations security (OPSEC) has been threatened by the use of
personal technology by soldiers in deployed environments. The use of personal fitness
apps with GPS tracking has created publicly available information that can be used to
find locations of military bases and regular routes taken by solders. As a quick fix to the
problem, On August 6, 2018, the Pentagon stated that “Defense Department personnel
are prohibited from using geolocation features and functionality on government and
nongovernment-issued devices, applications and services while in locations designated as
operational areas”.42 Issues like these will continue to occur as new technology becomes
available. New technologies will continue to be developed and utilized at a rate faster
than policy analysis, development, and implementation can occur. To recognize and
adapt to new technologies as quickly as possible, the U.S. should task a small analytical
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unit within each operational governmental organization with proactive analysis of its own
OPSEC in the realm of new technologies and applications. This unit would also make
recommendations on the policies regarding use of these technologies. The U.S.
government must not be reactive in the realm of OPSEC. Implementation of policies
restricting the type of GPS devices allowed on base should not occur after significant
damage to national security has occurred. Securing national security must be proactive;
focusing a group of analysts on emerging technological threats will help increase the
awareness of potential future technological threats.
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Sino-U.S. Relations and Managing China’s
Rise
“We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing
rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and
volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic
competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security…China
is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while
militarizing features in the South China Sea.”43 —2018 National Defense Strategy
China has been growing at a rapid rate economically, militarily, and
technologically. With the increase in power and influence, we have witnessed China
increasingly acting as a revisionist power. The Chinese government has made clear that it
intends to change the status quo and gain a a stronger and more influential position in its
region and globally. As the strongest global power and greatest benefactor of the status
quo, the United States sees China as a major threat to U.S. interests. China recognizes the
U.S. as the greatest obstacle to revising the world order and accomplishing its major
policy goals. Various Chinese actions have stoked major concern in the United States.
For example, China has been aggressively targeting the U.S. and others through various
means including hacking, cyber warfare, espionage, and attempts to alter territorial
boundaries in the South China Sea. These activities are enduring threats to the U.S. and
its partners.
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Every country, to include the United States, has limited resources. In an attempt to
allocate limited resources as effectively as possible, for the defense of the country and
promotion of national interests, assessment and prioritization of threats and challenges is
essential. To designate something as a “threat” requires an actor to have both capability
and intent. China is a threat to the United States in some specific areas (particularly in the
cyber domain) and is a threat to U.S. interests; however, China does not currently pose an
existential threat to the United States homeland or to the destruction of the international
order.
At this point, there is no evidence that China intends to engage in armed conflict
with any major power or completely overthrow the international order. It is not in the best
interest of the government to attempt either of these. Beijing clearly seeks to continue
growing its economy and gain greater influence in current systems. China wants a greater
share of influence and decision-making ability, which could take place in current systems
and organizations. Beijing has also launched major new initiatives in order to extend its
influence, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB).
How the U.S. reacts to the growth of the Chinese economy and increasing
political influence will greatly impact the future of the international order. The
geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific has been changing and will continue to
change with the growth of China. As much as possible, the United States must adapt to
these circumstances and utilize a whole-of-government approach to influence and shape
these inevitable changes to protect U.S. interests as much as possible. Attempting to
contain China, as it once contained the Soviet Union will not work; China’s economy is
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more diversified and, due largely because of the size of its population and impressive
economic growth, China is emerging as a peer competitor both economically and
militarily. Moreover, the ruling Communist Party has maintained internal cohesion, in
large part through repression and the extensive use of surveillance technology. As such,
the United States must recognize that a policy that tries forcibly to contain China will
increase adversarial tension and, while it may slow China down, will likely fail in the
long run. China’s strategy is long-term and U.S. policy must also focus on longer-term
interests. To address Chinese strategic competition, and protect long-term U.S. interests,
the U.S. should adopt a policy to manage China’s rise. If the United States is not involved
heavily in the region, the vital U.S. interest of advancing American influence (Trump’s
fourth pillar) with not be furthered.

Managing China’s Rise
The first requirement of creating a sound strategy and subsequent policy is a
proper assessment of the strategic facts on the ground and context of the heavily
globalized strategic environment. The basic premise of this strategy is the realization that
China will continue to rise, even if Western nations try to forcibly contain it.
Consequently, a policy of strong containment would, at most, provide short-term benefits
and would likely sacrifice longer-term interests. The primary long-term goal of managing
China’s rise is a minimally altered U.S. led international order with a China that acts as a
responsible, invested shareholder in the current order. It is counterproductive and a waste
of limited resources to try to contain China and struggle with Beijing at every turn—and
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this policy will ultimately fail anyway. Instead, the United States should pick its battles
wisely, prioritize the most important long-term goals, and provide incentives for Beijing
to be more invested in the current world order as it continues to grow economically and
gain more influence. This will require some short-term sacrifices, which I will propose in
later sections, but ultimately will promote the continuation of a U.S. led international
order that has greater adaptability. In today’s rapidly evolving global environment,
adaptability is absolutely critical to the long-term success of an international order. A
static system that continually fights change at every turn is a system that is destined for
failure, but a system that adapts and effectively manages change may thrive.

Chinese Threats and Challenges
Graham Allison argues in The Atlantic that “the defining question about global
order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s
Trap.”44 After his team at Harvard analyzed the historical record of rising revisionist
powers, he points out that twelve of sixteen cases over the past 500 years resulted in war.
Additionally, he argues that “based on current trajectory, war between the United States
and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than
recognized”.45 While great power transitions are incontestably dangerous, Allison fails to
emphasize the extent to which nuclear weapons have substantially raised the risk and cost
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of war between great powers. While there will continue to be significant competition and
confrontation between the U.S. and China, it is difficult to imagine that both China and
the U.S. would be willing to risk total war. They have a strong incentive therefore to seek
a stable balance—even if that requires substantial compromise. The current relationship
with China is adversarial for many reasons politically, economically, and militarily—
which all make progress difficult. However, making efforts now to create a more positive
and less adversarial Sino-American relationship may increase China’s willingness to
assimilate into an international order with fewer revisions than are currently being
sought.
Pessimism about China’s intentions is largely based on the assumption of
indefinite rule by an authoritarian regime bent on expansionism. Some scholars point out
another possibility, in which the economic liberalization required for continued growth
leads to political reform. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, in Seoul, South Korea, believes that the growth may actually lead to the
transformation of the authoritarian regime. In China’s Future is South Korea’s Present he
wrote:
There are two possible paths for China going forward: political liberalization,
which would enable continued economic success, or authoritarian retrenchment,
which would slowly but surely undermine China’s economic growth. The lesson
of South Korea is that when it comes to sustaining economic growth, political
liberalization is not a matter of choice.46
Chaibong argues that economic liberalization generates pressures that even authoritarian
leaders cannot fully repress. If this assessment is correct, it would be possible that China
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is on a path towards political liberalization similar to what was seen in South Korea—as
democratization and rapid economic growth turned it into a model for the appeal of a
liberal internationalist world order. Taking a harder line on China may impede that
prospect and be counterproductive.
The recent protests and riots in Hong Kong, stemming from China’s desire for
greater political control in the region, point to the possibility that China is starting to see
significant effects from economic liberalization. Even with broad censorship across the
internet, people still communicate and act through other means. The protests in Hong
Kong against increased mainland government control, seem to provide added support for
Chaibong’s argument, as President Xi has apparently concluded that crushing Hong
Kong’s human rights demonstrators is not worth the prospective economic and political
costs. That hesitation could even lead to an increase in pressure within China for political
liberalization.
Balancing the need for close diplomatic relations with the need to deter Chinese
actions counter to U.S. interests is a daunting task, and one can hardly exclude situations
that make these two goals mutually exclusive. One area that has been degrading the SinoU.S. relationship is the cyber domain. Even though attribution in this environment can be
extremely difficult, there have been attacks that the U.S. believes with high confidence
have been sponsored by the Chinese government. This has made fostering this
relationship increasingly difficult, but there are actions that can and must be taken to
mitigate some of the damage.
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Cybercrimes, Hacking, and Espionage
David Sanger, in The Perfect Weapon, describes the relationship between China
and the U.S. as a “new cold war between the world’s two largest economies.” Sanger
argues that China’s interests extend beyond territorial claims, as it seeks to achieve “the
keys to reemerging as a global power … [through] artificial intelligence, space
technology, communications, and the crunching of big data.” That goal, he notes,
requires China to outmaneuver the United States.47
Cyber espionage, hacking, and intellectual property theft have become major
points of tension between the U.S. and China as well as other countries. As stated in the
2016 U.S. National Security Strategy: “Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S.
intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary
technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of
free societies”.48
In Operation Aurora, conducted in 2009, Chinese hackers breached Google’s
security and searched for source code from Google’s search engine. They wanted to
recreate Google’s successes and create a more state favorable internet search engine
within China. This type of cyber activity hurts the economies of countries, but generally
has minimal impact on international security. However, as part of operation Aurora, the
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Chinese were able to get ahold of court documents from the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and other judges around the country. This gave a serious
advantage to China’s clandestine intelligence establishment. The ability of Chinese
intelligence to know if its spies are compromised and under investigation, before they
have actually been charged with a crime, is extremely advantageous.49 This has serious
potential to undermine the FBI’s counter-intelligence operations and significantly weaken
national security.
The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) hacks were another case with
large potential consequence to U.S national security. In the summer of 2014, the SF-86
forms for 21.5 million people were copied from the OPM’s database. By the end of the
year, 4.2 million personnel files were stolen—which included social security numbers
and other sensitive information. In addition, 5.6 million fingerprints also ended up stolen.
The damage to the U.S. national security apparatus was clear. With this information, it
would be much easier to track down spies, hack into people’s accounts, find cleared
federal employees, determine best or most vulnerable targets for blackmail and bribery,
and utilize or share this information in many other damaging ways.50
Another complicating factor is that even though these capabilities and types of
attacks seem to be highly detrimental, many countries that have advanced cyber prowess
are hesitant to give capabilities up or pursue meaningful agreements to stop or limit
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usage. Some types of cyber tactics are also not universally considered extremely
dangerous or a major slippery slope. In regard to the Chinese hacks on the U.S., the
former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper actually respected Chinese
cyber-espionage and understood why they decided to perpetrate these operations, saying:
“You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.” Additionally, Clapper wanted
to make it known that this was not only one-sided and that “if we had the opportunity to
do the same thing, we’d probably do it”.51
These types of attacks can also interfere with diplomacy and bilateral or multilateral agreements—which can have international security complications. Constant cyberattacks create a continual sense of conflict between the countries which foments an
adversarial mentality. This is true not only for the leaders, but also extends to citizens of
the countries attacked as well. Attacks can also affect a state’s sovereignty and human
security. For example, cyber-attacks on a state’s democratic electoral process clearly
interferes with state sovereignty and governance, while sabotaging a power grid can
cause death and other serious societal consequences.
We know hackers steal people’s identities and infiltrate private emails, … We
know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now our
enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial
institutions, our air-traffic-control systems. We cannot look back years from now
and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our
economy52 – President Obama
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Capability is growing and attacks that actually cause physical damage or put people in
danger have already occurred.
Internationally, there is currently a major gray area regarding cyber weapons and
tactics. There is frequent, if not constant, conflict occurring in the cyber realm that has
mostly stayed below the threshold of escalating to physical violence between states—the
most public exception to this being the Israeli airstrike on a what its military said was
“HamasCyberHQ”. In this instance, the military stated that they “thwarted an attempted
Hamas cyber offensive against Israeli targets” and “targeted a building where the Hamas
cyber operatives work.”53 Managing escalation is essential, but the location of the exact
line in the sand (or code) remains in question. The limits on escalation are also clearly
dependent on the adversary and their respective escalatory capabilities.
In the past, there has been reported Chinese hacking that targeted energy
infrastructure and oil.54 How leaders interpret such attacks has profound security
implications. Attacks that could impact or threaten human security or critical national
infrastructure could be designated as acts of war and could potentially start a major
kinetic conflict. Attacks that have negative impacts on national security would be more
likely to elicit a response, but at what point a victim is willing to escalate depends on a
vast number of factors. It also would vary from country to country and different leaders
would likely have different thresholds.
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The U.S. itself is suspected to be among the many actors that have used cyber
capabilities to significantly damage an adversary’s national assets—one example being
the Stuxnet computer worm attack on Iran. Iranian centrifuges used to refine nuclear
material were suspected to be damaged by a U.S./Israeli cyber-attack, which significantly
set back the country’s nuclear program.55 Some of these attacks can potentially be
executed by sophisticated non-state actors as well—which further complicates the
creation of clear policies or international laws regarding cyber-attacks. Additionally, the
difficulty in correctly attributing cyber activities to a specific actor adds a significant
component of complexity and difficulty in the policy and decision-making process.
One response tactic to the use of cyber weapons/attacks is to react immediately
both physically and decisively, which Israel utilized in May of 2019.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) … launched a physical attack on Hamas in
immediate response to an alleged cyber-assault. The IDF hit a building in the
Gaza Strip with an airstrike after claiming the site had been used by Hamas cyber
operatives to attack Israel’s cyber space.56
If attribution can be made with high-confidence, this type of response may be effective
against terrorists or other non-state actors who are in current warzones and are targeting
critical infrastructure—or other assets that are critical to national security. In such cases,
maximizing deterrence would involve publicized threats linked to prospective cybertargets. If executed successfully, this response could stop active attacks, destroy critical
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personnel and equipment required to conduct attacks, and also serve as a deterrent for
future attacks from some other actors. However, this is clearly not an appropriate
response to non-state actors perpetrating cyber-attacks from within another sovereign
territory outside of a warzone. Ideally, the other state would be able and willing to assist
in finding and stopping the threat; however, it is much more difficult in cases where the
threat is originating from an adversarial nation that might either be supporting the actors
or have no incentive to stop them.
It is difficult to react to cyber threats from within other adversarial nations’
territory except for increasing cybersecurity defenses—especially if the U.S. itself wants
to retain the right to use this capability itself whenever it deems necessary. In terms of
cyber-espionage, exploiting weaknesses is the typical modus operandi and will certainly
continue to occur. However, agreements and accords can help to make progress in other
areas. Even if accords are not comprehensive and fall short of effectively prohibiting
activities in this domain, it will still create a dialogue and understanding between the
states regarding what is known and allowed in the relationship—which is important for a
healthy and cooperative relationship. According to Sanger, after Obama announced an
accord that curbed some of the cyber means of intellectual property theft, there was
actually a “marked drop-off in that kind of hacking by the Chinese”.57 Therefore, it seems
some progress can be made, even though cyber-arms control meets heavy resistance by
states that have already developed advanced capabilities.

57

Sanger, D. E. (2019). The Perfect Weapon: War, sabotage, and fear in the cyber age. New York:
Broadway Books.

43

It is time the U.S. responds to address the deepening danger of cyber-attacks
originating from within sovereign states by initiating an ongoing international dialogue
aimed at establishing norms and guidelines in order to decrease the risks of
miscalculation. Additionally, the U.S. must increase cyber defenses through coordination
and sharing of information with its allies. Working with other states by communicating
when and how attacks occur can increase the ability to defend against these attacks.
Having technical knowledge of how the perpetrators are attacking can help prepare and
provide resilience—much like getting a vaccination ahead of time to prepare a body’s
immune system by building up its defenses to fight off specific types of biologic threats.
The U.N. Institute for Disarmament and Research has noted the glaring absence of such
and institutional effort:
Cyber specialists within regional organizations have themselves identified the
need to have an opportunity to meet with their peers from other regions in order to
explore opportunities for inter-organizational cooperation, exchange of
information and lessons, and potential informal (or more formal) mechanisms for
collaboration. While they often do so on the margins of other meetings, thus far
there lacks a structured opportunity in a neutral space for regional organization
representatives to discuss specific challenges, exchange ideas and share resources.
No one organization is “mandated” to convene the others and attempts to do so
thus far have been stymied by politicization by some members.58
Should such an international dialogue be created, it should include creation of an
international database which catalogs Information and Communication’s Technologies
(ICT) threats and categorizes them by type of attack and (as much as possible) by
location. The information would come from public and private sector organizations
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worldwide after an attack has occurred. This database would be able to be accessed by
anyone, but the information on the type of vulnerability exploited would be provided by
the victim of the attack only to trusted partners. According to U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 73/27 (A/RES/73/27) Section 1.11:
States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share
associated information on available remedies for such vulnerabilities to limit and
possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent infrastructure.59
Thus, this database should be managed by the United Nations, possibly through the Open
Ended Working Group—which is focusing on developments in the field of information
and telecommunications in the context of international security. Knowledge of the type of
vulnerabilities that have been found and exploited can enable members to patch their
software and reduce/counter these vulnerabilities.
While states are likely to share some information formally and informally with
certain allies and partners, this international database administered by the U.N. would
provide data that can be utilized for various assessments. It can help create a better threat
picture and shed some light on a domain that is very esoteric. Illuminating the types of
threats and attacks, as well as where they originate, may help to determine the degree to
which certain state and non-state actors are involved and provides the foundation for
greater cooperation and resilience. It can also lead to legitimate calls to action against
cyber-aggression from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other state and non-state
actors.
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South China Sea
The South China Sea is a major economic corridor: $3.37 trillion worth of trade
passed through this sea in 2016 alone. Additionally, 40% of global liquefied natural gas
trade transited through in 2017. Since 2013, China has created 3,200 acres of new land in
disputed waters in the Spratly Islands [see appendix]. The South China Sea is also rich in
mineral resources. It is estimated to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.60 The building of artificial islands, in an attempt to harden its
territorial claims and militarize the Spratly Islands, is an attempt to subvert ordinary
means to resolve territorial disputes and undermine U.S. influence. According to the 2019
DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment: “China will continue increasing its maritime
presence in the South China Sea and building military and dual-use infrastructure in the
Spratly Islands to improve its ability to control access, project power, and undermine US
influence in the area.”61 Territorial aggression in the South China Sea is one of the
significant challenges posed by China to the international order. As Patrick Cronin
characterizes the threat:
Beyond Asia, the South China Sea is at the nexus of the global economy upon
which all major trading nations’ prosperity depends. About 90 percent of global
commercial trade is seaborne, and more than a third of all that trade crosses the
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South China Sea … where America’s ability to project power in support of
freedom of the seas is increasingly open to question.62
Cronin correctly argues that the future stability of the region and international order
(especially at sea) is at stake. It is not the specific rocks, reefs, and resources that are of
the biggest concern, but instead the bigger picture of the actions being taken by the
growing revisionist power. In Cronin’s view, the U.S. should not go a single day without
sailing its vessels through the South China Sea or flying its aircraft over the islands. Doug
Bandow, however, challenges that approach as provocative and counterproductive:
For Washington to attempt to coerce the PRC over interests viewed in Beijing as
important if not vital guarantees a much more confrontational relationship. China
likely would respond by matching American air and naval maneuvers,
accelerating military outlays, and challenging U.S. interests elsewhere. Indeed,
turning today’s regional dispute into a quasi-superpower confrontation would
raise the stakes and make the issues harder to resolve.63
Bandow argues that the U.S. should withdraw from East Asia, abandon the fight
for regional hegemony, and withhold security guarantees from threatened states, and take
no position regarding competing territorial claims. That argument is flawed. China will
continue to get stronger economically—albeit at a less rapid pace than seen in the recent
past—and will have the resources and desire to continue to build its military. A U.S.
departure from the region would leave a vacuum that would almost certainly be filled by
China. Abandoning allies now would be a disaster politically and militarily, placing vital
trade routes under Chinese control, and signaling worldwide the likelihood that the U.S.
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will retreat when a revisionist power challenges the status quo. However, Bandow does
raise a persuasive challenge to Cronin’s faith in a more robust strategy of deterrence.
China is becoming stronger and will perceive certain interests, including in the South
China Sea, as vital to its national security—even if defending those interests entails high
cost and risk.
Cronin and Bandow both make important points, but neither complete withdrawal
nor attempting aggressive and robust military deterrence are viable solutions. Using only
military strength and maneuvers to coerce and antagonize one another may preserve
status quo in the short-term but involves an unavoidable risk of miscalculation, while
deepening the cold war atmosphere characterizing Sino-U.S. relations. To formulate a
more effective and longer-term South China Sea policy, significant diplomatic efforts
must be undertaken by both sides. This will include the willingness to compromise and
find solutions that both sides ultimately can put to paper and agree upon.
To achieve this goal, the U.S. and key partners will likely have to nudge Chinese
decisionmakers towards an acceptable solution using a diverse set of capabilities and
resources. The situation in the SCS must be handled using a more efficient, highly
coordinated U.S. led multinational effort, which must take a more robust whole-ofgovernment approach carefully utilizing several different diverse elements of national
power. The Department of State would lead this effort but would involve many other
parts of the government including the Department of Defense and other interagency
partners. This approach must include a strong long-term strategic diplomacy, a carefully
planned strategic messaging campaign, and economic/trade agreements with allies and
partners in the region. The creation of multilateral agreements with as many partners and
48

allies in the region will be essential to presenting a united and determined front opposing
aggression in the SCS; there is strength in numbers and ultimately this will enable all
parties involved to keep SCS operations more aligned with the environment in the past—
although all parties must be willing to find a middle ground. This middle ground will be
hard to negotiate and likely take many rounds of negotiations with the various interested
parties.
A temporary understanding will likely need to entail an arrangement somewhat
similar to the dispute over Taiwan. According to the U.S. Department of State:
The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The 1979 U.S.P.R.C. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In
the Joint Communique, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint
Communique also stated that the people of the United States will maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is responsible for implementing U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong,
unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to
further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal
basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and
enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive
capability. The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait
differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and
encourages both sides to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of dignity
and respect.64
The U.S.-Taiwan relationship should continue to remain with this understanding.
Although the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence, it has committed to “assist in
maintaining its defensive capability” and “opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by
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either side.”65 This wording does not officially commit the United States to defending
Taiwan militarily, but only assisting in maintaining Taiwan’s capability for defense.
However, if China were to attempt to make “unilateral changes to the status quo”, this
wording does not specifically exclude the possibility that the U.S. could actually provide
some sort of active military defense. If China were to perceive that the U.S. is not
committed to the defense of Taiwan, then a forceful attempt at reunification may be more
likely to occur. To preserve the status quo, the U.S. must continue its strong economic
relations with Taiwan and its significant support for strengthening Taiwan’s defensive
capacity.
Politically, keeping open the option of actively engaging in the military defense of
Taiwan, while not directly stating this publicly, is an appropriate policy but it must be
supplemented by specific and pointed strategic messaging—including military
coordination and exercises. In order to deter potential Chinese aggression, it is critical
that the United States is perceived to be able and willing to defend Taiwan—regardless of
whether or not the U.S. is actually willing. Until and unless all parties are willing to
diplomatically negotiate towards more permanent solutions, the U.S. and its allies should
continue to firmly protect the status quo—both with Taiwan and the South China Sea.
The best short-term solution involves neither side officially conceding to the other. The
U.S. should eventually, after returning to a policy of greater inclusion in the region, lead
the charge in trying to shore up support for a more permanent diplomatic solution.
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A potential longer-term solution in the South China Sea combines both Cronin
and Bandow’s arguments. The U.S. completely withdrawing from the region is not in the
U.S. or its allies’ best interests; however, neither is intensifying the conflict and
significantly damaging U.S.-Sino relations through attempts to forcibly contain China. As
China gets stronger, it naturally will fight harder for its important national interests and
will build the capabilities necessary to achieve its major policy goals—as seen with the
expansion of its navy. With this understanding, the U.S., its allies, and partners must
strive to protect their national interests as much as possible and also, to a certain degree,
allowing China to do the same. What is of greatest importance for the U.S. is protecting
the vast amount of international trade that transits this sea and sustaining the international
order. A negotiated agreement must include adequate protections for trade to continue as
normally as possible, while also ensuring that China feels like it has adequate security
along its bordering seas. Former China director of the National Security Council, James
Keith, has stated: “China is fighting back against American dominance as it tries to carve
out a place for itself in the region.”66 At the same time, other regional states must feel like
they also have adequate space and security along their borders and in their exclusive
economic zones. The Nine Dash Line (See Appendix) must be adjusted to provide a more
workable and reasonable middle ground and, if all sides are open to discussing changes, a
solution may still be possible.
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China must be willing to shrink its maritime claims—which have been deemed
illegal by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hauge, Netherlands with regard to
international law.67 Peter Dutton, Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and
Researcher at its U.S.-Asia Law Institute reacted to this ruling: “Over time, this decision
will inevitably be the basis for resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea. Equally
inevitable is that a final resolution will be through negotiation between the parties. But I
believe there will still be a long road ahead.”68
Making some changes and conceding to some of China’s interests for a broader
regional security and economic agreement may be in the best interests of many states that
are involved. Where this line is drawn must be open for discussion by all parties
involved; at this point, without deep discussions between the states, it is impossible to
determine exactly where that line may eventually be agreed upon. However, a workable
agreement certainly requires U.S. leadership, strength, and influence at the table in order
to counter-balance China and defend the other regional states’ interests. Additionally,
U.S. partnerships in the region must be as strong as possible in order to present a more
unified multilateral front against strong Chinese assertiveness in the region. This is
essential for adequately managing China’s rise over the coming years.
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Taking on an influential role in the Indo-Pacific is directly aligned with at least
three of the Trump Administration’s “four pillars” of vital national interest: American
prosperity, advanced American influence, and promoting peace through strength.
International relations professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Stephen Walt stated, “Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership on
his third day in office, thereby destroying a key institution that would have bound a
number of Asian countries more tightly to the United States”.69 In place of the TPP, the
remaining nations signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 22 items suspended that the United States wanted
included.70 The U.S. withdrawal certainly raised questions about U.S. commitment in the
region. The U.S. must show greater leadership and involvement in the region or China
will fill the void and U.S. interests will certainly not be protected. The U.S. should
commit to reentering this agreement and negotiating favorable terms. Additionally, the
U.S. needs to commit to strengthening existing partnerships and building new ones where
possible. Furthermore, the U.S. should either provide enhanced alternative means of
funding for Asian infrastructure or try to influence the Asian Infrastructure Development
Bank by joining, as other U.S. allies have, and becoming an influential member. Greater
U.S. involvement and support in the Indo-Pacific will increase influence and enable the
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U.S. and partner nations to utilize various types of influence and pressure to achieve more
favorable outcomes regarding Chinese action in the SCS and in future conflicts.
Rep. Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the U.S. House Armed Services
Committee, and other congressmen believe that there is a significant need for legislation
addressing U.S. commitment, action, and funding in the Indo-Pacific. In April 2020,
Thornberry released a discussion draft of a potential Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative
and stated:
Senior officials from both parties, military commanders, and international security
experts have told us for years that the Indo-Pacific must be this country’s priority
theater. They are absolutely correct, and it is time to put our money where our
mouth is. These are not all new programs, but by pulling them together under one
policy we will be better able to judge our own commitment here at home,
demonstrate our resolve to our allies and partners, and deter China. We may not
be able to cover all of these programs this year, but it is important that we make a
start, and then use this legislation to measure our progress going forward.71
Legislation directing additional funding and increased U.S. involvement in the IndoPacific is an important step towards protecting long-term U.S. interests.
Additionally, U.S. Senate should ratify the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As Congressman Hank Johnson has argued, “[t]his treaty is
of paramount importance to American national security interests and our political and
economic interests in Asia as well. It offers the legitimacy of the rule of law to our
actions, especially in areas that are contested.”72 This would decrease U.S. hypocrisy with
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regard to international rule of law and would provide more legitimacy to the claims of the
United States, especially with regard to current challenges both in the SCS and in the
Arctic—where Chinese and Russian presence are rapidly increasing. Admiral Harry
Harris, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, also has voiced his support for
ratifying UNCLOS. He believes not being a signatory negatively impacts U.S. moral
standing and has an economic impact, especially in the Arctic.73

PLA Navy Growth and Modernization
Oriana Mastro, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University,
has argued that China is playing the long game and semi-stealthily becoming a greater
power.74 She has adequately described the method by which the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) intends to achieve its major goals.
China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air,
maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its
will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s
leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions,
which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests.75 –U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency
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Understanding the modernization of forces is critical when forming policy and the U.S.
must be proactive in ensuring that the outcome is as favorable to U.S. interests as
possible. The Rand Corporation did a comparative study of the U.S. and Chinese
militaries and has determined:
Over the past two decades, China's People's Liberation Army has transformed
itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. Although
China continues to lag the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware
and operational skills, it has improved its relative capabilities in many critical
areas … China’s improved performance could raise costs, lengthen [an IndoPacific] conflict, and increase risks to the United States.76
Economically, China’s GDP growth has been significantly higher than the United
States over the past few decades.77 “The gap between the size of the two economies in
terms of nominal GDP is expected to lessen by 2023; the U.S. economy is projected to
grow to $24.88 trillion by 2023, followed closely by China at $19.41 trillion.”78 Below is
a chart from the World Bank comparing the two nation’s GDP growth as a percent:
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“China’s double-digit economic growth has slowed recently, but it served to fund
several successive defense modernization Five-Year Plans”.79 China has “built more than
one hundred warships in the past decade, a build rate outstripping the mighty U.S.
Navy” and is believed to be building several aircraft carriers.80 The Peoples Liberation
Army and its Naval branch (PLAN) are growing and modernizing at a rapid pace—
especially with regard to its aircraft carrier program.
Five years after commissioning its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, China
launched its second carrier – the Type 001A – on April 26, 2017. Unlike its
Soviet-built predecessor, the Type 001A is China’s first domestically built carrier.
Both carriers are similar in size and use a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested
Recovery) system for the launch and recovery of aircraft. Although similar to
the Liaoning, the Type 001A features some notable enhancements and represents
an important step in China’s developing aircraft carrier program.81
The Type 001A is suspected of being the first of three planned domestic aircraft
carrier models. Enhancements are expected include an increase in airwing size, and faster
cruising speed. Some key vulnerabilities include the use of a ski jump, instead of a launch
system, which requires a speed of around 20 knots to launch fixed wing aircraft. It is also
conventionally powered, instead of nuclear. “Beijing probably also will use the carrier to
project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean. The
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carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by
2019”.82
Although the Type 001A is vastly inferior to the American Nimitz and Ford class
carriers, the plans for a Type 002 and Type 003 are of great significance. Both the Type
002 and 003 have already begun construction. The Type 003 is expected to include the
addition of an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)—currently the most
advanced aircraft launch system—and nuclear power. If the Type 003 has these features,
it will have capabilities similar to the USS Gerald R. Ford—which was commissioned in
2017 as the newest and most advanced U.S. naval carrier. Both the rapid progress of this
carrier program and the massive amount of resources devoted to it are evidence of
Beijing’s intent to become a larger player globally. These carriers will change the
operational environment in the near future, create novel challenges in the region, and
must be considered when developing short, mid, and long-term strategies regarding
China.
That expansion in Chinese naval power would alone make it vital to prioritize a
diplomatic approach to managing the changing geopolitical relationship. China’s leverage
is going to increase as its economy and military continues to grow. Thus, it is in the best
interests of the United States to create a deeper and more effective Sino-American
dialogue now. This includes negotiating legal agreements before China gets even more
leverage. With adequate U.S. influence and pressure in the region, there may be a
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possibility for some small agreements regarding arms control and dialogue across
multiple domains of great concern and rapid development—including outer space and
cyber. Cooperation and dialogue would be in U.S. and neighboring states’ best interests.
China’s growth and goals require some adjustments in the status quo. Outside of the
general challenge to the status quo of the international order, some specific Chinese
actions are only moderately concerning and are strikingly similar to historical and current
paths taken by great Western powers.
China’s economic growth and desire to play a more active role in the region has
already changed the geopolitical calculus. Some argue that a policy of containment is the
proper reaction, but this policy lacks situational awareness and is nearsighted. It is true
that the PLA Navy will not achieve complete parity with the U.S. Navy any time soon;
however, in a few short years China is expected to achieve technological parity with U.S.
Aircraft Carriers and has already developed a fifth-generation fighter—the J-20. A small,
but similarly capable, naval fleet in the Indo-Pacific region will substantially change the
geopolitical situation and power dynamics. Since the U.S. and other powers are unwilling
to go to war with China, by preemptively destroying these already partially built carriers,
the U.S. must consider some foreign policy adaptations.
As China continues to become a greater power, the key to achieving long-term
peace in Sino-American relations is accepting that Beijing play a larger and more
responsible role on terms seen as acceptable and reasonable by the U.S. and its allies.
This includes insisting that it become a responsible part of the world order that already
exists. It also includes that other countries make reasonable changes that are necessary to
account for China’s core national security interests. This includes ensuring that the PRC
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feels as though it has sovereignty and security. The U.S. should focus its efforts less on
fighting China at every point possible and more on setting up an environment favorable
to the U.S, while strategically picking its battles. Regarding the South China Sea,
negotiations will have concessions on all sides and ultimately create an agreement on
which regional actors can agree. However, this does not mean give up or be soft on
China. China must and will understand that the U.S. will secure its interests abroad and
will defend the freedom of the seas.
Additionally, it is essential that key allies like the Philippines, Taiwan, and others
in the region take on a larger role in their defense. The U.S. can and should support these
allies, but China must perceive these countries as capable and willing to defend
themselves at all costs—instead of perceiving the conflict as being directly with the
United States. A focus on ensuring and promoting international support is also essential.
Support from the international community will ensure the strength of the international
order and create buy-in from other countries. This is also true for recommended actions
within the U.S. and through international organizations regarding cyber threats. There are
some key issues that both countries will perceive as vital and not easily find compromise
on, but the conversations must be had with open minds and dedication.
Stated in the unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, in part
“the willingness of rivals to abandon aggression will depend on their perception of U.S.
strength and the vitality of our alliances and partnerships”.83 Thus, the U.S. must continue
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to modernize and build its military capabilities, strengthen international support and
alliances—especially with India—and continue to create mutually beneficial economic
partnerships. The U.S. must also be willing to make some concessions in areas that are
more vital to Chinese national security than U.S. national security.
The amount and type of resources the PRC has dedicated to its military and cyber
capacities have made its intentions clear; one way or another China will play a larger role
in its region and beyond. This is why creating an environment where China acts more like
a partner in the security of the region, instead of an adversary, is absolutely critical. Not
only is this shift essential to avoid increased tension and danger, but also can prove to be
mutually beneficial. However, work towards this shift needs to begin now. The ability of
both sides to view the relationship as more of a partnership is temporally bounded and
becomes less likely every day. The stronger the Chinese military and economy get the
less Beijing will be willing to negotiate. Additionally, if the countries wait too long to try
to accomplish this shift, there likely will be a point of no return and the Sino-U.S.
relationship will be so steeped in past transgressions and conflict that a shift in the
relationship will become even more difficult, if not impossible.

A Long-term Strategy
China will continue to gain economic, military, and political strength in the IndoPacific and abroad. A policy based solely on containment will be counterproductive and
fail. Instead, the United States should adopt a policy of rise management as the strategic,
long-term goal that accepts the current strategic environment and adapts to the modern
61

challenges presented by China’s rise. Militarily, the U.S. must continue investing and
developing to maintain a strong credible deterrent and as much relative strength as
possible; this will also maintain a strong position for negotiations. Additionally, the U.S.
must be a unifying force and an enable partners and allies to strengthen partnerships and
increase defenses to deter aggressive Chinese action.
In the cyber domain, the U.S. must increase defenses and work with the
international community to increase capabilities for attribution. The U.S. should clearly
convey to Beijing and other actors where it considers cyber-attacks to be escalatory in
nature, in order to effectively deter some types of attacks. Economically, the U.S. should
be creating and maintaining strong trade and economic partnerships/agreements in the
Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the U.S. should be providing incentives for Beijing to be more
involved in current multinational institutions, which may include allowing for Beijing to
have greater influence in some decision-making processes. If the U.S. utilizes this policy,
managing China’s rise will provide the best chance of achieving a long-term peaceful and
beneficial U.S. led international order with China acting as a more responsible
shareholder.
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The Way Forward
In this globalized and rapidly advancing technological world, the national
interests of one state are increasingly overlapping with other states’ interests.
Globalization and the rapid advancement of technology has changed the utility of force in
the 21st century. The utility of force has evolved, resulting in a shift in the character of
war. This shift entails an increased focus on methods of force mainly below the threshold
of traditional armed great power conflict. Furthermore, the actions of one sovereign
nation are increasingly likely to impact other sovereign nations. This holds true in many
areas, even between states that have different political systems and ideologies.
Technology has made the world smaller and significantly increased the ability of actors
to cause significant global effects. This is one significant reason why NORAD &
USNORTHCOM Commander General O’Shaughnessy states that the “homeland is no
longer a sanctuary”84 and described the situation while testifying before the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee on 13 February 2020:
In the years following the Cold War, our nation enjoyed the benefits of military
dominance as well as geographic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the
reach of most conventional threats… Eroding military advantage is undermining
our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter aggression against
the homeland… The threats facing our nations are real and significant. The Arctic
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is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they
are now avenues of approach for advanced conventional weapons and the
platforms that carry them. Our adversaries’ capability to directly attack the
homeland has leapt forward…85
The rapid advance of technology will continue, and new developments of offensive
weapons will occur much faster than effective defenses. This demands new strategies and
policies, if the U.S. led international order is to thrive. Avoiding severe consequences
requires a greater willingness for global cooperation, even between nations and political
systems that are vastly different from each other. However, when faced with overtly
aggressive actors like Russia, where tensions are already extremely high, the building of
defenses as rapidly as possible is critical for defense and deterrence. At the same time,
diplomacy, dialogue, and a willingness to respond with strength is essential. The U.S.
response to Russian aggression requires more traditional strength through deterrence and
strategic messaging, but dialogue and cooperation is still incredibly important for the
future of more positive U.S.-Russian relations.
In the cyber domain, the U.S. must increase defenses and work with the
international community to increase capabilities for attribution. The U.S. should clearly
convey to Beijing, Russia, and other cyber-actors where it considers cyber-attacks to be
escalatory in nature, in order to effectively deter. At the same time, innovating and
building systems to counter new technological threats is essential. Additionally, the U.S.
must build deeper public-private partnerships and enact legislation to increase the
protection for the electoral system.
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China’s long-term realist strategy is smart and likely to succeed—barring major
events the dramatically shift the geopolitical landscape. It is in the United States best
interest to plan for continued Chinese economic growth and influence both regionally and
globally. At this point in time, it would be counterproductive, at best, to try to take a
hardline containment strategy against China. Instead, the United States can and should
take action to create the conditions necessary for Beijing to benefit from becoming a
more productive member of the current international order. It is clear that the Communist
Party of China does not believe in democracy or freedom. These strong shared values
have brought democracies together for decades, but these values will not incentivize
China to join the U.S. led liberal order. Instead, Beijing must believe there is actual
benefit from being a productive member. Thus, diplomacy and negotiation in terms of
economics and power structures will prove of the utmost value. It is essential that the
U.S. and other nations be willing to offer actual economic benefits and, in some areas,
more authority and responsibility.
The U.S. and its partners must provide incentives and create the necessary
conditions for a favorable outcome, but China must ultimately make the decision to take
this path forward. In the long-run, small sacrifices today will bring much greater benefits
tomorrow. The alternative policy option of using only the stick—attempting to contain
China by all means possible—would bring short-term benefits at the cost of long-term
disaster. If the Chinese make the wrong choice and threaten the international order that
has defended peace and prosperity for decades, then the U.S., its allies, and partner
nations must be willing and able to resolutely defeat any and all future threats that may
come from China.
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The U.S. needs to prioritize efforts to strengthen its economic, political, and
military partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. must be more involved in economic
agreements in the region and place an emphasis on strategic messaging. Until more
permanent diplomatic measures are agreed upon, the U.S. must strongly defend the status
quo in the SCS and with Taiwan. Additionally, Congress should work towards an IndoPacific Deterrence Initiative and the U.S. Senate should ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ratifying UNCLOS will further
legitimize U.S. actions in the SCS and the Arctic and decrease perceived U.S. hypocrisy
with regard to international rule of law.
The United States must also be keenly aware of growing Sino-Russian relations.
Richard Weitz, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political Military analysis at
the Hudson Institute, has stated that military ties between these two nations have been
growing and:
“Sino-Russian security cooperation presents challenges to U.S. interests,
including to the regional security balance, U.S.-led sanctions, and U.S. military
freedom of action and access. These challenges would grow if China and Russia
were to form a full-fledged defense alliance.”86
Weitz says that China and Russia have some mutual interests, especially when it comes
to countering the United States and undermining U.S. bilateral and multilateral alliances.
He believes that the military ties are set to deepen, which can prove very problematic for
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the United States.87 If Weitz is correct, the U.S. will need to counter an increase in SinoU.S. military relations as much as possible and will also need to evaluate what
consequence specific actions in the region may have on these relations before taking
them.
Globalization, rapid technological advances, and the change in the character of
warfare demands new strategies and policies. If the U.S. led international order is to
thrive, U.S. policy and strategy must prepare farther into the future than just one four- or
eight-year presidential administration. If the United States is to compete effectively with
other strategic competitors, longer-term interests need to be of greater importance than
short. The U.S. strategy must utilize a whole of government approach to adapt to the
modern complex threat environment and keep partisan and policy disputes within
manageable limits. Global partnerships must be a priority—and it is essential for the U.S.
to be adaptable and dynamic if it is to remain a global leader.
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Afterword: The COVID-19 Pandemic
As this thesis was being finalized, the COVID-19 virus spread across the globe
causing the World Health Organization to declare a pandemic.88 The effects of COVID19 are expected to be far reaching, although the full impact at this point cannot be known.
The global economy will be significantly impacted, at least in the short-term, and the full
effects of COVID-19 are yet to be seen as it relates to international relations and
geopolitics. “SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is thought to have first
jumped from an animal host to humans in Wuhan, China”89 and the full impact this
virus will have on the people of China and the Communist Party has also yet to be seen.
In March 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
announced that it would be kicking out U.S. journalists during the pandemic.90 China
claimed that this was in reaction to restrictive measures on journalists from China, but
removing foreign journalists makes it easier to restrict reporting on the impacts and
response to COVID-19 within China. During this critical time and as the situation
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progresses, the manner in which China-U.S. relations are conducted will likely have an
effect on how the foreign policies of both nations evolve. Additionally, there has been a
significant drop in oil demand as various types of global stay-at-home orders have been
implemented—which will significantly impact Russia, at least in the short-term.
The tragic and deadly COVID-19 pandemic has raised some questions which
have yet to be fully answered, especially how it started and what China could or should
have done to contain the virus early. Hopefully, the world can learn from this and better
prepare for potential future pandemics. Whatever the full impacts may be in China,
Russia, and the United States, the consequences of COVID-19 provide additional mutual
incentive to try to deepen international dialogue and cooperation in this globalized world,
where decisions across the globe can have severe global impacts at home—making
everyone a stakeholder.
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